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I. INTRODUCTION

{1} Electronic mail ("e-mail") has taken its place as an integral part of communication in modern society.[3]
Unlike other forms of communication, e-mail can cheaply and efficiently be placed in a public domain for
literally the world to see.[4] These public areas, otherwise known as bulletin boards, have expanded society's
ability to communicate over vast distances.[5] Individuals or groups can also engage in mass communication,
which involves a myriad of topics and concerns.[6] Nevertheless, such electronic communications, as almost
any other form of communication, can become volatile and create animosity among users.[7] Hence, many of
the remarks made in such exchanges can become defamatory in nature. When such banter becomes litigious,
e-mail and Internet service providers ("ISPs") are brought into the fray.[8]
{2} As employers increase in size and sophistication, many are becoming providers or users of e-mail and
Internet services.[9] Accordingly, these employers, in hopes of expanding their scope of communication,
have opened these communication portals to their employees.[10] As this trend continues, employers are
finding that they, like "traditional providers,"[11] are subject to suits involving libel, sexual and racial
harassment.[12] Thus, employers find themselves traversing a quagmire of liability. Defamation liability is a
primary concern, considering that one misplaced e-mail message can bring forth tort-based suits against an
employer. Nevertheless, based on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals misinterpretation of the
Communication Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA")[13], employers will find that the CDA will serve as their
talisman to defamation liability.
{3} This article will focus on the development of libel law as it pertains to publishers and distributors of
information. The article will then address the modification of this legal landscape as applied to employee email and Internet communication.[14]

II. PUBLISHER VS. DISTRIBUTOR LIABILITY[15]
{4} According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, "one who repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory

matter is subject to liability as if he had originally published it."[16] Consequently,
[t]hose who manufacture books by way of printing and selling them, and those who
print and sell newspapers, magazines, journals, and the like, are subject to liability
as primary publishers because they have the opportunity to know the content of the
material being published and should therefore be subject to the same liability rules
as are the author and originator of the written material.[17]
Though the printer or seller of newspapers, magazines or journals is not invariably vicariously liable for the
acts of the author,[18] there are instances where strict liability was imposed.[19] If a principal-agent
relationship exists between the parties, liability on the part of the principal can be found.[20] If this
relationship is evident, then the publishing of an intentionally false communication that injures another's
reputation or good name may result in defamation liability.[21]
{5} Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court placed limitations on the class of persons who could be
construed as "publishers" for the purpose of defamation actions. This narrow class of individuals, as
articulated by the Court in Smith v. California,[22] encompasses those construed as "distributors" of
publications.[23] In Smith, the Supreme Court heard the case of a proprietor of a bookstore who was
convicted of violating a Los Angeles city ordinance which prohibited the possession of any obscene or
indecent writing, or book.[24] In analyzing this strict liability ordinance, the Court found that, "[b]y
dispensing with any requirement of knowledge of the contents of the book on the part of the seller, the
ordinance tends to impose a severe limitation on the public's access to constitutionally protected matter."[25]
Such restrictions would undeniably reduce the amount of reading material accessible by the public due to the
seller's inability to familiarize himself with so many works.[26] The Court reasoned that, "the distribution of
all books, both obscene and not obscene, would be impeded."[27] Therefore, the Court held that an ordinance
that has a tendency to hinder the freedoms of speech and press "cannot stand under the Constitution."[28]
{6} As a result of this holding, other courts began to seize upon the distinction drawn between publishers and
distributors. Accordingly, distributors of defamatory material may be found liable for defamation only "if
[they] know[] or ha[ve] reason to know of its defamatory character.[29] This definition forces plaintiffs to
meet a higher burden when determining the culpability of vendors, booksellers or distributors. As a result of
this higher threshold, courts have been able to ease the fears of chilling communication. The paradigm of this
distinction - as applied to Internet communication - surfaced in Cubby Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.[30] The
plaintiff, Cubby, Inc. ("Cubby"), filed suit against CompuServe, Inc. ("CompuServe"), for allegedly
defamatory messages posted on a forum accessible through CompuServe.[31] The forum was regulated by
Cameron Communications, Inc. ("CCI"), which was independent of CompuServe.[32] A publication
available as part of this forum was Rumorville USA ("Rumorville") which was published by Don Fitzpatrick
Associates of San Francisco ("DFA").[33] DFA was under contract with CCI, and CompuServe contracted
solely with CCI.[34] CompuServe, therefore, had no direct relationship with DFA.[35] Therefore,
CompuServe had no opportunity to review Rumorville's contents before DFA uploaded it into CompuServe's
computer banks, from which it became immediately available.[36] Thus, when allegedly defamatory remarks
concerning the plaintiffs were seen on the Rumorville website, the plaintiffs asserted libel claims against
both, CompuServe and Fitzpatrick.[37] CompuServe argued that it was a distributor of Rumorville, but not a
publisher; the ISP asserted that it was not "liable on the libel claim because it neither knew nor had reason to
know of the allegedly defamatory statements."[38] Cubby, however, argued that CompuServe was a
publisher, and because of that status, Cubby proposed that it did not have to meet the higher standard of
distributor liability.[39]
{7} The district court, in noting the differences between distributors and publishers, pointed out the
similarities between CompuServe and a bookseller.[40] In articulating this point, the court looked to Smith v.
California,[41] in which the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that if, "[e]very bookseller would be placed under

an obligation to make himself aware of the contents of every book in his shop. It would be altogether
unreasonable to demand so near an approach to omniscience."[42] Hence, the district court found
CompuServe to be a distributor, and held that since CompuServe had no knowledge or reason to know of the
statements made in Rumorville, it was not liable for the statements.[43] The Nassau County New York
Supreme Court, however, did not follow Cubby's reasoned example. In Stratton Oakmont, Inc., v. Prodigy
Service,[44] Stratton Oakmont Inc. ("Stratton Oakmont") initiated a suit against Prodigy Services Company
("Prodigy"), the owner and operator of a computer network on which allegedly defamatory messages
appeared on October 23 and 25, 1994.[45] Judge Ain ruled, as a matter of law, that Prodigy was the publisher
of these statements.[46] The court reasoned that since Prodigy exercised editorial control over its bulletin
boards and likened itself to newspapers, the ISP takes on the same liability as a publisher.[47] Evidence of
Prodigy's control was Prodigy's promulgation of guidelines and the use of Board Leaders. The court found
that the guidelines and use of the Board Leaders rendered Prodigy a publisher with the same responsibilities
as a newspaper.[48] Accordingly, Prodigy was found liable as a publisher.[49] This holding created concerns
that the development of Internet services would be inhibited due to the fear of ISP liability.[50] The end result
was the creation of provisions of the CDA in order to counteract and mitigate the chilling effect of Stratton
Oakmont.[51]

III. THE INTRODUCTION OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT OF 1996 ("CDA")
{8} Section 230(c) of the CDA provides that, "[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider."
[52] The language of this statutory provision of the CDA evidenced Congress' rejection of classifying ISPs as
publishers for liability purposes.[53] Congress, in articulating this point, prohibited provider or user liability
if such provider or user took action to restrict access to material it believed to be "obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected; or . . . any action taken to enable or make available to information content
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1)."[54]
Congress also broadly defined a provider of an interactive computer service to include "any information
service system or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a
computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet . . . ."[55] This
specifically tailored language eviscerated Judge Ain's interpretation of provider liability in Stratton Oakmont.
{9} The legislative history of this provision reveals Congressional fears that future cases, allied with Stratton
Oakmont, would force ISPs to stop policing their servers in order to minimize libel suits.[56] Such an
outcome, some believe, would indirectly allow obscenity and other offensive material to flourish.[57]
Congress, anticipating such an outcome, determined that it was necessary to overrule Stratton Oakmont.[58]
Congress specifically stated that: "[o]ne of the specific purposes of this section [Section 230] is to overrule
Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have treated such providers and users as
publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because they have restricted access to objectionable
material."[59] The conferees further explained their rationale behind Section 230, when they remarked that
decisions such as the one in the Stratton Oakmont case create serious obstacles to the federal policy of
empowering parents to control the content of electronic communications their children receive via the
Internet.[60] Congress made it clear that it is the policy of this country to remove disincentives to the
development of filtering technologies.[61] Further, Congress emphasized this point by expressly preempting
inconsistent state laws.[62] The result of the CDA was the re-emergence of the holding in Cubby.[63] This
distinction once made by the district court in Cubby, resurrected by Congress' CDA, seemingly destroyed any
other interpretation of provider/distributor liability for ISPs. The CDA reduced the field to only distributortype liability.[64] Hence, individuals pursuing providers for defamatory messages posted via their servers can
only prevail if the provider knew or had reason to know of the defamatory messages. Accordingly, an ISP
would be akin to a bookseller, vendor, or distributor. In this manner, Congress maintained an ISP's ability to

exercise editorial control without being subject to a publisher's strict liability. This pendulum, which was
finally set by Congress through the CDA legislation, was then pushed in another direction with the emergence
of Zeran v. America Online, Inc.[65]

IV.THE EMERGENCY OF ZERAN CLOSES OFF ANY DISTRIBUTOR-TYPE LIABILITY FOR
INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS
{10} An individual, Kenneth Zeran, brought suit against America Online, Inc. ("AOL"), for the unreasonable
delay in removing defamatory messages posted by an unknown third party.[66] Specifically, this unidentified
third party posted messages on an AOL bulletin board advertising "Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts."[67] The
messages stated that those interested in purchasing the shirts were to call Ken [Zeran] and were given Zeran's
home phone number.[68] The posting of these messages resulted in a high volume of calls to Zeran at his
private residence.[69] Zeran notified AOL of this situation and was informed that the posting would be
removed, but that it was not AOL's policy to post retractions.[70] The next day, an unknown person posted
another message advertising the shirts, again gave Zeran's phone number, and told interested parties to ask for
"Ken."[71] These postings continued for the next several days and during this time, the volume of angry
phone calls to Zeran intensified.[72] Zeran also reported this to the FBI; yet, the angry phone calls still came
approximately every two minutes.[73] Finally, Zeran brought suit against AOL, arguing that AOL is liable for
defamation.[74]
{11} Zeran argued that Section 230 of the CDA eliminates publisher liability, but leaves distributor liability
intact for interactive service providers such as AOL.[75] Accordingly, AOL could only be found liable for the
defamatory messages posted on its server if it was shown that they knew or should have known of the
defamatory material.[76] Zeran consequently argued that AOL was provided with sufficient notice of the
defamatory messages and was therefore liable as a distributor, since AOL acquired knowledge of the
defamatory messages.[77] Chief Judge Wilkinson, writing for the panel, reasoned that since every repetition
of a defamatory statement is considered publication, when AOL repeats whatever is posted on its server, it is
legally considered a publisher.[78] The court found that "AOL falls squarely within this traditional definition
of a publisher and therefore, is clearly protected by [Section] 230's immunity."[79] Further, the court
reasoned that the distinctions between "publisher" liability and "distributor" liability both fall within the
larger publisher category.[80] Though the court was provided with the histories of Stratton and Cubby, the
court nonetheless found that there was nothing in these cases to "suggest that distributors are not also a type
of publisher for purposes of defamation law."[81] Therefore, the court held that the CDA "plainly immunizes
computer service providers like AOL from liability for information that originates with third parties."[82]

V. ZERAN'S FLAWED REASONING[83]
{12} The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' reasoning in Zeran is flawed in several ways. Primarily, Congress
enacted the CDA to prevent publisher liability as articulated in the legislative history of the CDA.[84]
Specifically, Congress wanted to prevent courts from classifying providers as "publishers" and thereby
possibly finding them strictly liable for defamatory messages posted by third parties on their servers. The
court, in Stratton Oakmont, had the option of finding that a provider was a "distributor" or a "publisher."[85]
{13}The court chose the latter and found Prodigy liable, as if they had originally published the defamatory
material.[86] This result, as feared by many, would chill providers from actively screening their bulletin
boards.[87] Congress, fearing this hands-off approach to Internet interaction as well as the unfettered
development of obscene and offensive materials, overruled this case by enacting the CDA, and making it
clear that providers or users of interactive computer services would not be treated as a "publisher" or
"speaker" if they took any good faith actions to restrict access to the availability of material.[88] This action
on the part of Congress specifically focused on the ramifications of Stratton Oakmont and thereby

reestablished the validity of Cubby, which found that provider liability was equivalent to that of a bookseller,
distributor or news vendor.[89] Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding redefined
"distributors" as nothing more than a subset of "publishers."[90] This judicial gloss on defamation liability
shifted provider liability from the strict application in Stratton Oakmont, to the prerequisite standard of knew
or should have known, pursuant to the CDA, to finally, the extremely generous status of no liability
whatsoever in a defamation suit in which a third party disseminates defamatory messages. Accordingly, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals effectively redefined the parameters of Internet provider liability in actions
for defamation. The court stated that, "[l]ike the strict liability imposed by the Stratton Oakmont court,
liability upon notice reinforces service providers' incentives to restrict speech and abstain from selfregulation."[91] The court went on to say that, "[i]f computer service providers were subject to distributor
liability, they would face potential liability each time they receive notice of a potentially defamatory
statement-from any party, concerning any message."[92] Though this statement gives insight into the court's
rationale behind finding that a provider will invariably be classified as a "publisher" and therefore not subject
to liability for defamation, this is not what Congress meant by enacting the CDA. This judicial legislating,
though noble in its foresight, nevertheless falls outside of the parameters of the judge's role in society. As a
result of the court's retooling of defamation law, other courts have followed this dangerous, diverging path. A
development of this shift from congressional intent to judicial legislating is also evident in the Blumenthal v.
Drudge case.[93]

VI. OTHER COURTS FOLLOW DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE
{14} In Blumenthal, White House employees brought a defamation action against a gossip columnist, Matt
Drudge, and AOL, for allegedly defamatory remarks about the Blumenthals that were posted on AOL.[94]
AOL had a licensing agreement with Drudge to make the publications of Drudge available to all members of
AOL.[95] The licensing agreement gave AOL the right to remove, or to direct Drudge to remove, content that
violates its Terms of Service.[96] The district court granted AOL's motion for summary judgment, finding
that AOL was a publisher and therefore immune to liability pursuant to Section 230 of the CDA.[97] The
court used the same reasoning of the Zeran court, in finding that "Congress has made a different policy
choice by providing immunity even where the interactive service provider has an active, even aggressive role
in making available content prepared by others."[98] Nevertheless, this court, like the Fourth Circuit, failed to
understand that Congress' purpose behind the CDA which was much narrower than the reasoning espoused
by both courts. Congress intended to prevent strict liability, as first imposed by the Stratton court. If,
however, the provider knew or should have known of the defamatory material, liability could be found. The
purpose of the CDA was to encourage the filtering of information that may be placed on the Internet.[99] In
that regard, distributor liability would force a provider to actively self-regulate defamatory material if
contacted about such information. With the judicial gloss placed on the CDA, there is now no incentive for
providers to filter any information or materials placed on their servers by a third party. Based on the holding
in Zeran, district courts within the Fourth Circuit have continued the misinterpretation of the CDA.
{15} In Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees,[100]the district court heard a suit in which an association,
Mainstream Loudoun, and ten (10) plaintiffs, sued Loudoun County public libraries for adopting a policy
which required site-blocking materials from their Internet accessible computers.[101] The Plaintiffs argued
that this policy "blocks their access to protected speech. . . ."[102] The Defendants, inter alia, argued that the
CDA, specifically Section 230, made them immune from suits involving the blocking and screening of
offensive material.[103] The Defendants pointed out that this must be true since the CDA defines an
interactive computer service to include "a service or system that provides access to the Internet [that is]
offered by libraries or educational institutions."[104] Though this language seemed clear enough, the district
court found that this language, though "facially attractive, it is not supported by that section's legislative
history or relevant case law."[105] The court ruled that "[Section] 230 was enacted to minimize state
regulation of Internet speech by encouraging private content providers to self-regulate against offensive

material. . . ."[106] Therefore, the court found that the CDA did not bar this action.[107]
{16} The conclusion reached by the court may have been correct, but the rationale used to reach that
conclusion is flawed and creates further confusion as to the proper interpretation of the CDA. The court, in
Mainstream Loudoun, could have just as easily discussed the applicability of the CDA to libraries; yet, it
maintained that Section 230 of the CDA only applied to matters involving "tort-based" liability. Therefore,
though libraries would be protected under the CDA from defamation suits, they would have no protection for
injunctive-based relief which was sought in this matter.[108] Instead of reading the plain language of the
statute, the court seized upon legislative history to make a point. As a result, other courts may interpret the
court's language to mean that public institutions would be subject to libel suits for defamation if they exercise
any editorial control over Internet access. This will then cause such institutions to either forego Internet
access or to refrain from blocking potentially offensive material for fear of acquiring liability as a "publisher."
This too will defeat the stated purpose of the CDA, which was to encourage the filtering of the Internet. As a
result, the law is skewed to prevent almost all defamation suits from proceeding against providers such as
AOL, yet to allow suits against public entities. In essence, the Fourth Circuit has given providers such as
AOL, CompuServe, and Prodigy no incentive to monitor their bulletin boards because of immunity, and
public entities such as libraries now have ample reason not to screen what comes across the Internet and into
a public library because of a lack of immunity. Such decisions pervert the intent of Section 230 of the CDA.
[109]

VII. IMPLICATIONS AS APPLIED TO EMPLOYERS
{17} With the advent of the CDA, coupled with its interpretation by Zeran, Blumenthal, and Mainstream
Loudoun, an interesting scenario develops. As it currently stands, private ISPs, regardless of their knowledge
of defamatory material, are absolved of liability in defamation suits. The only restriction on this absolution
would be in situations in which they themselves are the information content provider.[110] Therefore, if a
private ISP exercises control over an Internet bulletin board and knows or has reason to know of the
defamatory material posted on their board, they are still free from liability.[111] This congressional/judicial
change to the landscape of publisher liability for defamation on the Internet effectively creates a two-fold
problem when determining employer liability in situations where employers give employees access to e-mail
and Internet services.
{18} The CDA defines an interactive computer service to mean "any information service, system, or access
software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services
offered by libraries or educational institutions."[112] The CDA, as previously articulated, prohibits
defamation suits against providers or users of interactive computer services for allegedly defamatory
statements made by third parties.[113] This language, though originally tailored for Internet providers such as
AOL, Prodigy and CompuServe, can apply to other entities such as "employers,"[114]who use such services
to give their employees Internet access. Thus, the application of the CDA to today's employers, as interpreted
by Zeran and Blumenthal, becomes an important issue. If these cases do apply to "employers," then
employers will allow employees to say and post anything, since employers will be immune from liability. If
they do not apply to "employers," then liability suits must revert back to the publisher/distributor landscape.
{19} The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia's findings
of immunity for AOL translate into the same immunity for employers who know of computer messages being
sent by their employees that are defamatory in nature. If the provisions which provide immunity to ISPs, such
as AOL, are found to be applicable to "employers," then it is probable that an employer will make no effort to
curb many of the current e-mail practices of its employees, as defamation liability would not be forced upon
the employer. Imagine the following hypothetical. Assume that an employee who is part of the employer's

hiring committee sends an e-mail to others in the company making disparaging remarks about a potential
candidate for employment. The remarks, though untrue, keep the candidate from finding employment. This
message is then widely circulated and finds its way to the potential candidate.
{20} Under such a scenario, the employer may find itself facing a defamation suit for these ill-advised
remarks. Pursuant to the current setting of ISP liability, an employer would not be considered the Internet
content provider.[115] Therefore, it becomes conceivable that it would be construed as a provider or user of
an Internet service. Based upon Zeran and Blumenthal, the employer is not liable for the employee's
statements. Thus, an employer need not take any proactive step to stop such actions by an employee under the
current interpretation of the CDA. Though the actual creator of the message can be pursued, they may not be
able to remedy the harm already caused by the defamatory message. Therefore, regardless of whether the
defamed individual was an employee, the employer would have no reason to stop such actions. This turn of
events is contrary to the congressional intent of the CDA, which is to give providers and users incentive to
self-regulate.[116] Accordingly, an employer who may be subject to liability under the previous hypothetical
if the allegedly defamatory statement were disseminated in hard copy form, such as in the form of an internal
memorandum, would not face liability if it were e-mailed instead.

VIII. THE EQITABLE BENEFITS OF RECTIFYING ZERAN'S MESS
{21} It is necessary to rectify the series of problems that are developing as a result of Zeran and its progeny.
The rulings of Zeran and Blumenthal have rolled back the provisions established to foster the development of
filtering techniques on the Internet. As a result of Zeran, employers/ISPs have a diminished incentive to filter
what e-mails are passed through the workplace. However, this setting may not be seen as problematic in most
cases. For example, what are the implications of an employee sending offensive images with captions which
are defamatory in nature? Pursuant to the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the CDA, the employer would
only have to invoke the provisions of the CDA in order to gain immunity. Due to the ease in which e-mails
can be altered, a defamed private party may find no means by which to remedy this wrong. Under a
distributor liability framework, if an employer knows or has reason to know of defamatory material that is
being passed via the Internet, it can be held liable for the content of the message. As such, the employer
would have reason to promulgate policies regarding Internet e-mail usage. Such policies would further the
intent of the CDA in filtering information that is passed by this medium of communication. Employees,
knowing that such communication could be monitored and recorded, would refrain from acting impulsively
and unwisely.
{22} Some may argue that this stance on the development of the Internet and e-mail has Orwellian overtones.
Nevertheless, with the proliferation of other Internet and e-mail services, an employee can engage in
whatever acts they chose without subjecting the employer to libel claims. Under such circumstances, a
preferred balance is struck. The employer who is better able to regulate Internet and e-mail usage in the
workplace will do so for fear of liability. Additionally, under this proposed approach, a party who is defamed
will not be placed in a situation in which she cannot find a party from whom she can obtain a remedy.
{23} Without a fundamental change in the stance taken by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
employers/ISPs will depart from proactively developing filtering mechanisms in their Internet computing in
favor of adopting a more passive approach since distributor liability will no longer be a concern. Therefore, it
is imperative that other circuits take note of developments in this area of the law and tread cautiously when
entertaining the idea of adopting the reasoning promulgated by Zeran. To adopt Zeran would be to uncover
another level of issues, such as employer liability, which would run contrary to the purpose of the CDA. By
taking one step back and reevaluating the course this area of law has taken, the pitfalls of Zeran can be
avoided. Although, employees may scoff at the idea of an employer actively restricting Internet and e-mail
services, the benefits of such filtration merit further investigation and consideration on the part of employers.

This will give users pause when some decide to make statements that are neither true nor appropriate.
Maintaining distributor-type liability for employers will effectively clean up the information passed through
employer-controlled communication portals.

IX. PRIVACY ISSUES IF EMPLOYERS ACTIVELY FILTER E-MAIL
{24} If other courts decide not to follow Zeran, and employers are thereby forced to take a more active role
in supervising Internet communication, issues concerning privacy arise.[117] The reasoning behind such
fears is that, due to the passwords that are usually required for Internet access, employees believe that their
communications are private.[118] Furthermore, some cite to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
("ECPA")[119] as support for their right to obtain and utilize private e-mail.[120] Specifically, Section
2511(1)(a) of the ECPA prohibits the "interception" of electronic communications; therefore, some believe
that the review of e-mail sent through an employer's server would be in direct violation of the ECPA.[121]
Nevertheless, a carefully crafted policy statement, as well as the unique workings of Internet and e-mail
servers, enable an employer to monitor the e-mail communication of employees without violation the ECPA.
{25} An example of this e-mail monitoring dilemma arose in Bohach v. City of Reno,[122]wherein police
officers facing an internal investigation argued that investigators could not access messages stored in its
computerized paging system, since doing so would violate their right to privacy and be in violation of the
ECPA's provisions against the interception of electronic communications.[123] The district court ruled that
there was no violation of their right to privacy, nor of the ECPA.[124] The court reasoned that the officers had
a diminished expectation of privacy since the then Chief of Police notified all users of the system that
messages would be logged on the network.[125] Additionally, the court reasoned that the storage of messages
falls outside of the prohibited "interception" of messages because no lines were actually "tapped."[126]
Therefore, such messages in storage fall within the confines of Section 2701(c)(1) of the ECPA which "allows
service providers to do as they wish when it comes to accessing communications in electronic storage."[127]
Other courts in varying contexts have also adopted this "narrow" distinction of removing electronically-stored
personal messages from the "interception" definition of electronic communications under the ECPA.[128]
{26} Based on the aforementioned case law, it is evident that an employer can periodically review employee
e-mail that is in storage without fear of being subject to violations of privacy and the ECPA.[129] Some may
argue, as was done in Wesley College v. Pitts, that this narrow definition may allow those who obtain
messages from storage to circumvent the ECPA and to use those messages with impunity.[130] Nevertheless,
as the Wesley court articulated, this change must be made by Congress not the judiciary.[131] This differs
from the approach of the Zeran court, which used its position as arbiter of a landmark Internet case to
legislate. If the CDA was unhindered by its misinterpretation by the Zeran court, it would force employers to
become more aware of the possible liabilities associated with defamation law, and to take action to prevent
liability. Employers would be able to do so without fear of violating the privacy rights or the ECPA.

X. CONCLUSION
{27} If employers are paying attention to the development of this area of the law, they will find Zeran and
Blumenthal to be very powerful allies in averting defamation liability. If other circuits follow the path of
Zeran, the purpose of Section 230 of the CDA, which is to encourage self-regulation, will evaporate. Thus,
"traditional providers" and employers will have no incentive to regulate potentially defamatory information
that passes through their computer network. Accordingly, Zeran needs to be razed by other circuits in order to
reestablish the primary purpose of the CDA. This change would bring back the balance between freedom and
responsibility. If employers are forced to face distributor-type liability for e-mail in the workplace, there will
be an increase in the demand for filtering and monitoring technology. This will not only enhance
accountability for defamation purposes, but will also give others pause before they send a potentially

inflammatory e-mail message.
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